Certification of Origin and Brands Competition by Chambolle, Claire & Giraud-Heraud, Eric
 
Certification of Origin and Brands Competition 
 
Claire Chambolle 












Paper prepared for presentation at the X
th EAAE Congress 
‘Exploring Diversity in the European Agri-Food System’, 











Copyright 2002 by Claire Chambolle and Eric Giraud-H´eraud. All rights reserved.  
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any 
means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. Certiﬁcation of 0rigin and Brands Competition
Claire Chambolle∗et Eric Giraud-H´ eraud †
January 31, 2002
Abstract
We analyse the competition in quality and quantity between a foreign ﬁrm and
ad o m e s t i cﬁrm. The domestic ﬁrm can belong to a certiﬁcation of origin, whereas
its rival uses a pure brand strategy. We will show how the certiﬁcation can allow
the domestic ﬁrm to position itself as a high quality producer and improve the
average quality of the products oﬀered on the market. If, however, the certiﬁed
ﬁrm oﬀers the low quality good, the certiﬁcation can permit it to guarantee a
higher proﬁt than that of its competitor and to improve the consumers’ surplus by
favouring product standardisation.
Key words: Certiﬁcation of origin, Quality, international competition
JEL Classiﬁcation : L13,F12,F14
1 Introduction
Most of the micro-economic models which take into account the quality of the prod-
ucts oﬀered to consumers consider that a given quality level can be acquired through
investments by producers or, in other words, by a cost of production proportional to
this quality level. This is also the case of the analysis in terms of vertical diﬀerentia-
tion of products, from the pioneering contributions of Shaked and Sutton (1983), Mussa
and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1979), to the more recent works of Motta (1993)
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1and Lehmann-Grube (1997). These models indeed, include a good number of examples
(innovation technology, improvement of production procedures, hiring qualiﬁed work-
ers, spending on marketing, ) which at the accounting level and the analysis of ﬁrms’
behaviour on the markets certainly justiﬁes this type of approach.
Nevertheless, quality improvement remains especially complex in an industrial pro-
cess, particularly when it concerns products which have been transformed. Of course,
these cannot always be considered as additional production costs. In the agro-food sec-
tor in particular, the quality certiﬁcation systems are often based on the respect of a
certain number of production rules and not just on the ex post checking of the quality of
the product. The certiﬁcation of origins in this way deﬁnes territorial limits outside of
which a producer can no longer beneﬁtf r o mo ﬃcial certiﬁcation. This delimitation has
an eﬀect on the quantities produced. In the wine-growing sector it is not rare that these
certiﬁcations of origin specify, in addition, a limitation of the production of grapes (as
is the case of the French “Appellations d’Origine Contrˆ ol´ ees” (AOC), or more generally
the European “Quality Wines Produced in a Determined Region”, (VQPRD). This is
also found for cheeses with the deﬁnition of the breed of animal designated to produce
the milk and is the most often not optimal from the point of view of quantities produced.
It is the same for the quality labels in the meat sector which very severely restrict the
producers on the number of animals per hectare that they have and these restrictions
are often much more constraining than the need to invest in ﬁxed or variable costs to
satisfy production speciﬁcation requirements. Thus, the quality certiﬁcation systems
in agriculture are based more on production control, and therefore on quality on the
market, than on the necessity of incurring expensive but reproducible procedures for the
production system.
This paper proposes comparing the two competing systems to improve the quality
of products: The investment in research and development or brand promotion system,
which we will call “brand system”, and the “certiﬁcation system” of the A.O.C. type or
label of origin. The latter, as in the examples quoted above, imposes a control of the
oﬀer as a condition of having a level of certiﬁed quality. However, this system does not
rely exclusively on a control of the oﬀer, and the certiﬁed producers can always carry
out research and development and advertising to increase the quality of product.
The quality labels and the certiﬁcations of origin are the principle tools which are
used by the State to correct market dysfunction associated with consumers’ lack of infor-
2mation about the quality of the products (Gozlan, D., Marette, S. (2002). Most of the
theoretical works therefore concentrate on the compared eﬀectiveness of these systems of
revealing information to consumers from a point of view of oﬃcial economy (Shapiro C.
(1983), Marette, S. et al (1999)). Other works always within the framework of limited
information, analyse the private interests of a producer to certify the quality of his prod-
uct (Linnemer, L., Perrot, A. (2000), Ibanez (2001)). Following the example of these
works, the model which follows considers that the ﬁrms decide privately to submit to
the system of oﬃcial certiﬁcation. However, it is not the “revealing” of information of
the system of certiﬁcation side which is appreciated in this model. It does not concern
evaluating the beneﬁts of the certiﬁcation system in relation to a reference situation in
which consumers have no information about the quality of the goods which are oﬀered
to them. On the contrary, we assume that the consumers are perfectly informed about
the quality of the product. Naturally, we also assume the existence of a system of oﬃ-
cial certiﬁcation which guarantees a minimum level of quality which is acknowledged by
consumers. We then consider that the producer must make a choice between two strate-
gies. On the one hand, if he chooses to respect the production speciﬁcation requirements
he in return is granted minimum “certiﬁed” quality and can then improve his quality
with the help of traditional investments. On the other hand, the producer can adopt
a classical system of quality investment. In agreement with the illustrations borrowed
from the agro-food sector, the production speciﬁcation requirements are expressed by a
restriction of production capacity imposed exogenously by the establishment which con-
trols the certiﬁcation system. In other words, any ﬁrm wishing to adopt the certiﬁcation
system must submit to this capacity restriction in order to beneﬁt from the minimum
quality guarantee in exchange.
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of a certiﬁcation associated with such an oﬀer-
restriction policy. Our model is close to the works of Krishna (1990), Das and Donnenfeld
(1987), Herguera Kujal and Petrakis (2000), which we shall note in the continuation of
the HKP text and Boccard and Wauthy (2000), which we note BW, who analyse the
impact of import quota imposition or voluntary export restrictions on choices of quality
in the area of competition between several countries.
When there is competition between two countries, we will compare a mixed compe-
tition system, where only the home country is certiﬁed, to a situation of competition
between two non-certiﬁed producers. We will show how the unilateral adoption of a
3certiﬁcation system does not necessarily motivate the producer in the home country to
improve his quality. We clarify the foreign aspect created by the certiﬁcation system on
the quality of the product oﬀered by the producer in a foreign country as well. There
again, we show how this quality can become deteriorated after setting up the certiﬁcation
system in the home country.
2 The model
2.1 The oﬀer
Let’s consider two ﬁrms located respectively in the home country and in a foreign country
and which are competing on the domestic market. The ﬁrms in the two countries oﬀer
goods diﬀering in quality on the national market of a standard size as 1.
When a ﬁrm becomes certiﬁed, it commits itself to limiting its production to level z in
exchange for certiﬁcation. In return for the restriction in capacity z to which it assents,
the certiﬁed ﬁrm beneﬁts immediately from a minimal quality level s. This exogenous
parameter s reﬂects here the consumer satisfaction with such a system. A ﬁrm which
chooses brand strategy is, on the contrary, free to furnish all the demand, but has no
advantage for quality at the start.
Whatever the chosen strategy be, the ﬁrms can make investments to improve their
quality in relation to their initial quality (respectively, s for a certiﬁed ﬁrm or 0 for a
brand ﬁrm). These investments can represent technical innovation costs allowing for the
objective improvement of the quality of the goods, as well as costs of brand promotion
which contribute to improving the image and the reputation of the product. In these
two examples, the entailed expenses are most often independent from the quantities
produced, we therefore assume that a ﬁrm having adopted the brand strategy attempting
to reach a quality k has a ﬁxed cost for quality F(k)=1
2k2 The consideration of ﬁxed
costs allows us to measure the producers’ interest in innovating once they have beneﬁted
from a certiﬁcation system1.I faﬁrm adheres to a certiﬁcation system the investment
cost which must be spent to reach a quality level k>s , is written : F(k)=1
2(k − s)2.
As is shown in ﬁgure 1 below, the sums invested to reach quality level k are less.
1Diﬀering from the other form of considering quality costs and concern variable costs (see for example,
Champsaur and Rochet (1989), Motta (1993).
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Figure 1: Cost structure according to strategies
The two curves (1) and (2) presented in ﬁgure 1 correspond respectively to the two
strategies which a producer can adopt. For any quality level k, the brand strategy
is more expensive than the certiﬁcation strategy in terms of investment spending, the
compensation being that the producer is limited in the quantity put on the market. The
marginal cost of quality improvement is equally less when the ﬁrm is certiﬁed as well2.
2.2 La demande
Whether the ﬁrms adopt a certiﬁcation strategy or a brand strategy, we assume that the
consumers uniformly perceive the more or less objective quality associated with these
signals. The consumers on the domestic market are distinguished by a taste parameter θ
which expresses the intensity of an individual’s preferences for quality. The one dimen-
sional parameter θ is uniformly distributed over an interval [0,1 ] .W ea s s u m et h a te a c h
consumer can consume zero or one unity of goods.
The surplus Sj (θ) that an individual redeems from the taste parameter θ of the goods
of quality kj, purchased, is given as:
2If we admit that an inverse relation really exists between the quality potential of a product and the
quantity produced, this hypothesis reﬂects the least cost of quality improvement of a modiﬁed product
coming from the best quality raw material.
5Sj (θ)=θkj − pj,j= l,h (1)
Formulation (1) largely taken from theoretical literature is that of Mussa and Rosen
(1978), which expresses the surplus of the consumer as the diﬀerence between a reserva-
tion price and the actual purchase price pj. The reservation price is connected in a linear
fashion to the quality by the taste parameter θ. Thus the quality kj,s o l da tp r i c epj
cannot be bought by a type θ consumer except insofar as Sj (θ) > 0, so that the market
is not totally covered by incumbent ﬁrms.
In the case where two qualities are oﬀered with kh >k l, we obtain three types
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Thus, the consumption of each good depends on the qualities oﬀered and the prices
practised on the market. These variables are the outcome of a strategic behaviour and of
an arbitration of the ﬁrms. The principal factor which diﬀerentiates the ﬁrms strategies
concerning the quality produced, we hold here that the competition occurs in Cournot
fashion. Moreover, we consider a sequential game, where the ﬁrms choose the quality of
their product in the long term by anticipating the consequences on the competition in
quantity in the short term.
In the following section, we recall the results obtained by Motta (1993) when the two
ﬁrms are in brand competition. From this reference structure we evaluate the conse-
q u e n c e so fi n t r o d u c i n gac e r t i ﬁcation system in a game of competition.
3 The benchmark case : Motta (1993)
The case where neither of the two ﬁrms has adopted the certiﬁcation system can be
represented by a two-step competition where the ﬁrms choose their investments in quality
6and then compete in quantity in the absence of capacity restrictions. The result of the
two-step game of competition is furnished by Motta (1993).
With set qualities the prices for which the quality products kl and kh are sold are






pl = kl (1 − ql − qh)
ph =( kh − klql − khqh)
(3)
The ﬁrms choose their quantities for each pair of qualities (kl,k h) in maximising their
proﬁts.
πi (qi,q j)=pi (qi,q j)qi − F (ki) i = l,h (4)
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The functions of the reactions decrease in Cournot whereas they increase in the case
of a price competition.
Throughout the section, the exponent m reminds us that we are in the particular















We now look for the qualities chosen by the two ﬁrms for the equilibrium. By
replacing the above equilibrium quantities we can conclude with the help of (4) the
quality equilibrium of the ﬁrst stage of the duopoly game. The qualities, quantities and
proﬁts of the equilibrium obtained by Motta (1993) are as follows :
Table 1 : Perfect equilibrium of the duopoly
km
l =0 .09 km
h =0 .252
qm
l =0 .275 qm
h =0 .451
πm
l =0 .0027 πm
h =0 .0195
7The consumers’ surplus and the social well-being (sum of the surpluses of consumers
and producers) respectively noted SCm and W m are :
SCm =0 .0402
W m =0 .0624
The average quality obtained on the market is 0.19063. It must be noted that at




h ' 0.357, and
is always inferior to that which prevails when the ﬁrms are competing in price (in this
case, µ ' 0.1904). Indeed, the price competition being more intense, the ﬁrms are even
more motivated to diﬀerentiate themselves to preserve their market power.
Furthermore, the quantity of high quality goods produced is more than the quantity
of goods oﬀered on the low quality segment. This result is valid for a price competition
as it is for a quantity competition. However, if we introduce the variable quality costs,
the very nature of these costs leads to a lower quantity of high quality goods, whose
production becomes relatively more expensive, being put on the market in relation to
low quality goods. Consequently, the surplus of the consumers is always higher with a
ﬁxed quality cost rather than a variable cost. Indeed, the latter is maximal when all the
quantity produced is placed on the high quality market.
Finally, the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm which oﬀers the high quality product is always higher
than that of the ﬁrm which oﬀers the low quality product. This result is, as Lehmann-
Grube (1997) shows, valid for a very general ﬁxed cost structure. Since the ﬁrms are
perfectly symmetrical at the start, two perfect equilibrium exist: one for which a ﬁrm
oﬀers the low quality good and one for which the same ﬁrm oﬀers high quality. Each of
these ﬁrms prefers, of course, the equilibrium for which it oﬀers the high quality good.
4 Competition between certiﬁcation and brand
In this section we will present the competition game of quality and quantity when the
two ﬁrms do not have the same strategy. One of them is certiﬁed and the other adopts
a brand strategy. We have to consider, consequently, two situtations because of the
dissymmetry of the ﬁrms. Indeed the certiﬁed ﬁrm can oﬀer the high quality good as
well as low quality.
84.1 The certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the low quality good
We note cm, as the situation of competition between the certiﬁed ﬁrm c which is oﬀering
the low quality good and the ﬁrm of brand m; which produces the high quality. We go
back to the inverse demands system (3), but this time, the maximisation programmes
for the two ﬁrms diﬀer since the certiﬁed ﬁrm must respect the production capacity
restriction z in order to beneﬁt from a certiﬁed quality level s. We assume that the
parameter s remains inferior to the high quality level when the two ﬁrms are in brand
competition (s<1
4 given that km
h =0 ,252). In reality as soon as s becomes very strong,
the results are no longer surprising. Furthermore, we suppose, as of right now, that this
capacity restriction is still compelling, by considering that z<1






This condition is enough to insure that the certiﬁed ﬁrm will always be ex post restricted
whether it be of high quality or low quality. (Proof: see annex 1)
The ﬁrms choose their quantities for each pair of qualities (kl,k h) by maximising












We will now determine the qualities chosen by the two ﬁrms at the equilibrium by
maximising the respective proﬁts. By replacing the equilibrium quantities above, the






l = pl (qcm
l ,qcm
h )qcm
l − F (kl − s)
πcm
h = ph (qcm
l ,qcm
h )qcm
h − F (kh)
(8)
After a few analytical calculations, we can deﬁne the equilibrium of type cm for all



























3 − 2z (1 − 2z)
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(10)









3 − 2z (1 − 2z)
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(11)
Indeed, it is technically more interesting to study scm (µ,z) to deduce the properties
of the equilibrium than to resolve the third degree equation by µ.





, scm(µ,z) is a strictly increasing
function in µ and decreasing in z.
Proof : see appendix 2.
The potential equilibra are described by curves scm (µ,z). In order to complete the
characterisation of this equilibrium, it is also necessary to verify that one of the two ﬁrms
doesn’t have an interest to deviate in inverting the order of the qualities, that is to say,
to leapfrog.
Lemme 2 : A function f(z)e x i s t sd e c r e a s i n gi nz with f(z) <s cm(µ,z), in such
aw a yt h a ti fs>f(z), the ﬁrm with the high quality brand would do well to oﬀer an
inferior quality to that of the certiﬁed ﬁrm.
Finally, an equilibrium of type cm exists for all values of s<f(z) We will give an
graphic illustration of the zone of emergence of this equilibrium later on.
We can conclude from lemma 1 as well, that at a given level s of certiﬁcation, when
z decreases, that is, when the capacity restriction becomes more conﬁning, µ decreases.
In other words, µ decreases when the capacity restriction becomes stricter while keeping
the right to an unchanged level of certiﬁcation s, the diﬀerence sharpens. Indeed, the
brand ﬁrm which produces high quality goods is then prompted to increase its quality
whereas the certiﬁed ﬁrm is inﬂuenced to reduce its quality. This eﬀect of the capacity
restriction is somehow a wealth-eﬀect, since the potential proﬁts of the certiﬁed ﬁrm
decrease when z decreases, whereas those of the competing brand ﬁrm increase3.
3These results agree with those of HKP, who examined the impact of an importation quota on the
quality choices of the two ﬁrms.
10Now if we reason at the level of ﬁxed capacity restriction z; the low quality ﬁrm
is always encouraged to increase its quality whereas its competitor decreases it when
certiﬁcation level s increases; the diﬀerence in the products decreases. In fact, the more
the certiﬁcation level increases the more the certiﬁed ﬁrm can attain a high quality for a
lower investment. On the other hand, s dissuades the high quality ﬁrm from investing in
quality. This eﬀect is paradoxical because when s increases, the certiﬁed ﬁrm increases its
quality, with the result that the high quality ﬁrm could, in order to maintain a suﬃcient
product diﬀerentiation, also be incited to raise its quality level. We will explain this
result in section 5.
4.2 The certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the high quality good
We now turn to determine the mc equilibrium for which the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the high
quality good when the brand ﬁrm oﬀers the low quality. The quantity produced by the













We notice that the equlibrium in quantity is not dependant on the quality levels kl
and kh chosen by the ﬁrms when the high quality is restricted by capacity. The ﬁrst











h = s +( 1− z)z
(13)
In this situation, we easily show that with s ﬁxed, when z decreases, the diﬀerence in
the products decreases. More precisely, the quality chosen by the certiﬁed ﬁrm is lower
whereas the quality chosen by the brand ﬁrm increases. Once again these results are
connected to a wealth-eﬀect and agree with those of HKP. Furthermore, with a ﬁxed
restriction capacity, an increase of the certiﬁcation level s allows the certiﬁed ﬁrm to
improve its quality without the brand ﬁrm having to change its own. The diﬀerentiation
of the products therefore is increased. There again, we would expect that, facing an
11increase in quality, of the certiﬁed ﬁrm its brand competitor would reduce its investment
in quality. This paradoxical eﬀect directly ensues from the independence between the
quantities and the qualities of the chosen equilibrium. Once again, it is necessary to
verify the incentives of the ﬁrms playing leapfrog.
Lemma 3:Ag (z) function exists, decreasing in z,i ns u c haw a yt h ei fs<g (z),
the brand ﬁrm which, in the framework of this equilibrium, oﬀers the low quality good
is moved to oﬀer a higher quality than its competitor.
Thus, as soon as s<g (z) an equilibrium no longer exists for which the certiﬁed
ﬁrm oﬀers the high quality good. We will now synthesise the results obtained in the two
cases.
4.3 Synthesis of the results
We are now able to prove the existence and to characterise all the equilibrium of the game
in which the ﬁrm from the home country becomes certiﬁed. The following proposition
synthesises the results obtained on the existence of an equilibrium.




¤2 , at least one
perfect subgame equilibrium exists when a certiﬁed ﬁrm and a brand ﬁrm compete.
Proof : we will show that g (z) is inferior to the function f (z) for all of z.F o rt h e
detail of the calculations refer to appendix 4.
Contrary to the cases studied in the preceding section, the two equilibrium no longer
always appear simultaneously. Indeed, for certain parameter values, only one perfect
equilibrium exists, whereas, for the intermediary values of z and s, the two equilibrium
coexist. The following proposition reviews the situation on these results:






*w h e ns>f(z), the equilibrium for which the certiﬁed ﬁrm produces the high
quality good is the only sub-game perfect equilibrium.
*w h e ns<g(z), the equilibrium for which the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the low quality
good is the only sub-game perfect equilibrium.
*w h e ng (z) <s<f(z), both sub-game perfect equilibrium exist.
12Proof : is immediately concluded from lemmas 2 and 3.














Figure 2: C o n ﬁguration of equilibrium cm and mc
In the above ﬁgure, as soon as s>f (z), the only equilibrium which emerges is
that for which the certiﬁed ﬁrm produces the high quality good. Indeed, when starting
from the equilibrium situation where the certiﬁed ﬁrm produces the low quality good,
and when s>f(z), the level of certiﬁed quality s is high enough in relation to a less
compelling capacity restriction, so that it becomes too expensive for the brand ﬁrm to
keep its position of high quality. It is then in their interest to leapfrog with low quality,
that is, to oﬀer an inferior quality to its competitor. Inversely, when s<g (z), the
capacity restriction which the certiﬁed ﬁrm must respect is relatively strong in relation
to the level of quality s guaranteed by this system, so that in starting from a equilibrium
situation where the certiﬁed ﬁrm produces the high quality good, the low quality brand
ﬁrm is moved to produce a higher quality than the certiﬁed ﬁrm. Thus, as soon as
s<g(z), the only perfect equilibrium which emerges is that for which the certiﬁed ﬁrm
oﬀers the low quality good.
In the framework of a sequential game with a strategic choice of quality and a com-
petition of prices between two countries, BW shows how the choice of an import quota
13permits the ﬁrm from the home country to position itself as leader in quality on the
market and by the way, to obtain the higher proﬁt (considering the result of Lehman-
Grube). We obtain here a similar result since the choice of an appropriate certiﬁcation
system (z,s) can lead to a single equilibrium. Nonetheless, within the framework of our
model becoming the producer of high quality does not permit obtaining the best proﬁt
systematically. Thus, we will demonstrate that because of existing asymmetry between
the ﬁrms, the Lehmann-Grube (1997) result is no longer always veriﬁed.
Lemme 5 : Whatever the pairs (z,s)s u c ha ss>g(z), the certiﬁed ﬁrm by oﬀering
the high quality product, makes a smaller proﬁt than that of the brand ﬁrm which oﬀers
the lower quality. A function h(z) exists decreasing in z,s ot h a ti fh(z) ≤ s ≤ f (z), the
brand ﬁrm by oﬀering the low quality product, makes a better proﬁt.
Finally, when the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the high quality good, they always make an
lower proﬁt than that of their competitor, whereas, when the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the
low quality good it can make a lower proﬁt than its high quality competitor. Indeed, a
capacity restriction z less than 1
4 is much more restrictive for a high quality ﬁrm which,
in the absence of a capacity restriction, would oﬀer a greater quantity of the good than
a ﬁrm which oﬀers the low quality product. Therefore, contrary to BW, if the choice
of a particular system (z,s)c a ns t e e rt h er o l eo ft h ec e r t i ﬁed ﬁrm, that is, the one to
produce the high quality or the low quality of the good, it can never guarantee obtaining
the best proﬁt. On the contrary, the choice of a particular (z,s) can guarantee the best
proﬁt to the brand name competitor.
Undoubtedly, the two ﬁrms make the best proﬁt when the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the
high quality good. The certiﬁed ﬁrm improves its proﬁt because it oﬀers the high quality,
however it is then restricted even more by quantity, the competition ﬁnds itself even more
diminished which favours the competitor. The two ﬁrms could come to a tacit agreement
on such an equilibrium.
5 Competition certiﬁcation-brand vs. brand-brand
We will study, ﬁrstly, the incentives of a low quality or high quality ﬁrm within the
framework of the brand-brand competition to adopt the certiﬁcation system which is
14proposed to it unilaterally.
5.1 Proﬁtability of the certiﬁcation strategy
Even if a certiﬁcation organism exists, the request for certiﬁcation is always a matter
of a private decision on the part of the producer. Under what conditions based on the
(s,z) parameters would adherence to a certiﬁcation system be proﬁtable for a ﬁrm?
As it is represented in ﬁgure 3, we can distinguish three types of answers in function









Figure 3:P r o ﬁtability of the adoption of a certiﬁcation strategy
The equations for the limits of these three regions are given in the annex. In zone A,
the certiﬁcation system is too unfavourable for a ﬁrm to choose to adopt it. Particularly,
if s is nil, taking on a capacity restriction can never be advantageous for a ﬁrm whether
it be placed initially with high quality or with low quality. In zone B, the certiﬁcation
system becomes more advantageous and this time a brand ﬁrm with low quality will
systematically choose to be certiﬁed. If (z,s)i ss u ﬃciently high, the certiﬁcation system
will even be able to allow it to automatically place itself with high quality. Finally,
15in zone C, whether or not the ﬁrm be initially of low or high quality, it will choose
to become certiﬁed and systematically oﬀer the better quality good. Therefore, a ﬁrm
initially oﬀering the high quality in the brand-brand context, will never accept being
certiﬁed if it risks, ﬁnding itself with low quality by doing so. Finally, as the certiﬁcation
system becomes both less restricting and more estimable, it is more quickly favourable
to the producer that was with low quality initially.
5.2 Consequences of certiﬁcation on average quality
We will ﬁrst analyse the theoretical case for which the certiﬁcation level is oﬀered gra-
tuitously to one of the ﬁrms, that is, without imposing the capacity restriction on it
in return (s can then be interpreted as simply a brand image advantage acquired by
the ﬁrm). After that, we will analyse the combined eﬀect of s and of z on the chosen
qualities.
¥ If the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers low quality
I nt h ec a s ew h e r es is oﬀered gratuitously to the low quality ﬁrm, the ﬁrm should
naturally increase its quality. The competing brand name ﬁrm should also raise its
quality, but this time for inciting diﬀerentiation regarding its competitor. However, as
soon as we add a capacity restriction to a ﬁxed s, the competing brand name ﬁrm should
reduce its investments in quality from now on. When s i n c r e a s e st h i sr e s t r a i n te ﬀect is




















Figure 4: Eﬀect of an increase of s on the incentive to invest in quality
First, let’s consider the function of the best reaction (1) of the brand name ﬁrm for
a ﬁxed level of the parameter s. The impact of a reduction of quality k1 on the loss of
quantity q1 of the brand name ﬁrm can be seen by going to the reaction function (2). For
a same reduction in quality, the brand name ﬁrm under goes a loss of demand BC if its
competitor has a capacity restriction and AC if it is not subject to the restriction. The
ratio BC
AC is inferior to 1, which explains the eﬀect of the restraint in quality investment
felt by the brand name ﬁrm when its competitor has a capacity restriction. This curve
(2) which corresponds to a reduction of k1, can also well correspond to an increase of
s at ﬁxed initial quality level (indeed, s makes k0 increase). If we now reproduce a
new equivalent reduction of k1,w em o v et o w a r d sc u r v e( 3 ) .T h i st i m et h er e l a t i v el o s s
o fd e m a n di n c i t e di nt h ep r e s e n c eo fac a p a c i t yr e s t r i c t i o ni nr e l a t i o nt oas i t u a t i o n
without a restriction, is written FB
EA. W ep r o o v et h a tFB
EA < BC
AC,w h i c hp e r m i t su st o
conclude that when s increases, the restraint to invest by the high quality ﬁrm linked to
the imposition of a capacity restriction on its competitor, is strengthened. This eﬀect
is principally due to the capacity restriction which engenders a rigidity in terms of loss
of demand and leads to a lessening of quality on the part of the competitor. Indeed,
when even the brand name ﬁrm’s quality lessens, the consumers who would like to turn
to the low quality product cannot do so because the quantity oﬀered is restricted. It
is paradoxical that this eﬀect is even greater as s is increased. Undoubtedly, we could
17have thought that when s increases engendering low quality, the incentive to diﬀerentiate
would alleviate this eﬀect of restraint.
¥ If the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers a high quality
If the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the high quality good, and if it is oﬀered the certiﬁcation
level s gratuitously, it improves its quality whereas its competitor naturally reduces its
investments. Then in studying the impact of an increase of s to z ﬁxed, we verify that
if the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers high quality, it continues to increase its investments whereas
the certiﬁed ﬁrm keeps its investments unchanged.
We can then set foth the following proposition :
Proposition 2 : When the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the low quality good, the average
quality which is made available on the market to consumers decreases in relation to the
equilibrium of brand competition. On the other hand, if the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the high
quality good, the average quality of the products oﬀered to consumers decreases when
s<t (z), with t(z) <f(z).
Indeed, when the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers low quality, it increases its quality but the
quantity which it oﬀers on the market diminishes because of the capacity restriction
which it must respect. In addition, the high quality ﬁrm decreases its quality and what
is more, oﬀers a superior quality to that oﬀered within the structure of brand-brand
equilibrium. In all, the average quality decreases. If the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the high
quality, it increases its quality as soon as the certiﬁcation level is suﬃciently high, but
its quantity is restricted (even more) because of its position of high quality. The low
quality ﬁrm’s quality remains unchanged so that in the end, it is the decrease in quantity
produced of the high quality good that prevails and average quality decreases.
5.3 Consequences on the consumers’ surplus
We will now study the inﬂuence of the unilateral adoption of a certiﬁcation system on
the surplus of consumers on the home market in relation to the reference situation of
brand competition.
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The functions SCcm et SCmc are increasing in µ. In other words, the consumers’ sur-
plus increases when the diﬀerentiation of the products diminishes, the eﬀect of increased
competition gaining over the beneﬁcial eﬀect related to the segmentation of the market.
Both the expressions are naturally increasing in z. The less restrictive the certiﬁcation
system is in terms of quantity, the larger the global quantity put on the market is, which,
of course, beneﬁts consumers.
Proposition 3: : If the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the high quality product, then the
consumers’ surplus is always weakened in relation to the competitive brand situation. On
the other hand, if the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the low quality product, a function r(z) ≤ f(z)
exists so that if, r(z) ≤ s ≤ f(z), the consumers’ surplus increases in relation to the
equilibrium of brand competition.
The consumers’ surplus is at its maximum when the entire quantity is placed on high
quality. Finally, when it is the quantity placed on the high quality good that is restricted
by the certiﬁcation system, the capacity restriction is relatively more prejudicial to con-
sumers than when the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the low quality good. The negative eﬀect
related to quantities always prevails even over the moderate improvement of the quality
which can have a positive inﬂuence on the surplus.
When r(z) ≤ s ≤ f(z), the product diﬀerentiation is very small compared to the
brand competition situation. In addition the capacity restriction is relaxed, in such a
way that the eﬀect of the intensiﬁcation of competition prevails over the damaging eﬀect
of the capacity restriction. The consumers’ surplus is therefore increased. This result
according to which the consumers’ surplus can be improved in relation to a competitive
brand situation, when the ﬁrm from the home country chooses to become certiﬁed and
to oﬀer the low quality good, is surprising. Indeed, we could naturally think that if
s is strong enough to compensate for the capacity restriction, then this eﬀect on the
surplus was to be expected, however, the increase in the consumers’ surplus would bring
about then an improvement in the quality of the products oﬀered. On the contrary, we
have seen that when s increases, the average quality diminishes, and it is, after all, the
19phenomenon of product standardisation which, leading to a tougher competition, allows
consumers to beneﬁt from a better quality-price ratio.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has proposed the formalization of a certiﬁcation system through control of the
oﬀer. In our model, we assume that the certiﬁcation system is an exogenous given from
the producer’s point of view, and we analyse its implications in terms of proﬁtf o rt h e
ﬁrm that adopts it with average quality products and consumer surplus. We show how
a certiﬁcation system of the AOC or label of origin type, initially designed in order to
promote the quality of the products and protect consumers, can be used as an arm in the
competition game when it confronts a brand name production system. Inversely, we show
how the adoption of this type of system for the reasons mentioned above or simply for
individual proﬁt improvement prospects, can, on the economic level, be in contradiction
with its initial objectives. In reality, it appears through out model that the only way
to eﬀectively improve the consumers’ surplus is to promote an equilibrium which is not
too restrictive on the quantitative level and such that the certiﬁed ﬁrm positions itself
on the low quality segment. This equilibrium corresponds paradoxically to a situation
where the products are rather standardised and where the average quality is lower in
relation to that which would prevail with a brand competitor. Moreover, the only means
of achieving the best proﬁt in the industry and therefore win the competition game, so to
speak, is, once again, for the certiﬁed ﬁrm to oﬀer the low quality good while continuing
to respect the not too strenuous capacity restriction. This result is paradoxical and in
contradiction, for example, with the French policy adopted by INAO4 i nt h ew i n eg r o w i n g
sector which, wanting to strengthen the reputation of the image and the virtuous quality
of the AOC wines is on the way to adopting more restrictive production constraints.
Such a policy would automatically risk driving the certiﬁed ﬁrm to position itself in the
high quality area which, on the one hand would be damaging to consumers and on the
other, would play the competition game by allowing it to make a better proﬁt.
4Institut National des Appellations d’Origine.
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7.1 z<0.25




















2k1 >z ,f o ra l lµ,i fz<1
3. So if z<0.25, Then a
certiﬁed ﬁrm is always constrained in capacity.
7.2 Lemme 1: s(z,µ) /
∂s(z,µ)














whatever µ ∈ [0,1].
∂s(z,µ)
∂z = z (4(1 − µ) − µ3) − 1 < 0; This formula is strictly descreasing in µ,s oa
suﬃcient condition to be respected is that
∂s(z,µ)
∂z < 0i nµ =0 . Because z<1
4,t h i s
condition is true when µ =0 .
7.3 Certiﬁcation-Brand Equilibria





h = zM. In equilibrium, qualities kmc
l et kmc





h =( 1− z)z +s. Then proﬁts are the following : πmc
h =
(1−z)z





7.3.2 When the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the lowest quality
qcm
l = zM, qcm
h =
M(1−µz)
2 , with s = 1
4 [(1 − 4z2)µ − z2µ3 − 2z (1 − 2z)]. This formula
deﬁnes µ for all value of (z,s).k cm
h = θM
4 (1 − z2µ2) combined to the preceding equation
allow us to ﬁnd the equilibrium qualities. Similarly, proﬁts are : πcm
h =
kh
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We easily prove that
∂η(µ,z)
∂z =6 −2µ2−8(1+µ3)z+3(1+ 3µ4)z2 is always decreasing
in z and in µ.
∂η(1, 1
4)





∂µ =4( 1− µz)(1− 3µ2z2) > 0i ﬀ µz < 1 √
3 and this condition is always
veriﬁed.
So µ
0 (z) < 0. Finally, a suﬃcient condition for that
df (µ(z),z)
dz < 0i st h a tz< 1 √
7 '
0,378.





1 − µ − 1
4µ3¢
− 16zµ0 (z) − 12zµ2µ0 (z) − 6µz2µ0 (z)+
µ00 (z)(1− 4z2 − 3z2µ2).
As u ﬃcient condition for that f
00
(z) be positive is that µ00
(z) > 0,which is always
veriﬁed. So the function f(z) is convex. we now compare f(z)w i t hscm(1,z)=
1






=0 ,109. However when z =0 ,µ=1a n df(µ,z)=1
4 and when
z = 1
4,µ=0 ,787 and f(µ,z)=0 ,0774. So f(z) <s cm(1,z) for all z.
7.5 Proﬁtf r o n t i e r
¥ If a brand ﬁrm who oﬀers the highest quality chooses to certify, then
→ When does it improve its proﬁt?





8 (5z2 − 6z +1 ).






dµ =1− z2 − 3µ2z2 − 3µ2z4 > 0d e c r e a s i n gi nz and in µ.
When z =0 .25 and µ =1 ,
dπcm
0 (µ)




dµ > 0,and for πcm
0 (µ =1 )=1








24⇒ Does its competitor increase its proﬁt?
* If the certiﬁed ﬁrm remains the highest quality producer
πm
0 < πmc
0 <=>z<0.457 => always veriﬁed.
*I fi to ﬀers the lowest quality product:
πm
0 < πcm
1 <=>z<0.289 => always veriﬁed.
So, when the highest quality producer chooses to certify, it is always proﬁtable for
its competitor.
¥ If the brand ﬁrm who oﬀers the lowest quality product chooses to certify
→ When does it improve its proﬁt?
* If it remains the lowest quality producer :
πm
0 < πcm
0 <=>s>s 1 (z).s1 (z)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nz.





8 (5z2 − 6z +1 ).
⇒ Does its competitor increase its proﬁt?
* If the certiﬁed ﬁrm remains the low quality producer :
πm
1 > πcm
1 <=>s<s 2 (z).
* If the certiﬁed ﬁrm oﬀers the high quality
πm
1 > πmc
0 =>z<0.111. So if z<0.111 then the competitor beneﬁts from the
certiﬁcation of the domestic ﬁrm.
7.6 Consumers’ surplus
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(1+2z−µz) , knowing that
∂µ
∂s > 0, ∂kcm
∂s > 0i f1− 2µz − 3(µz)
2 > 0t h a ti si ﬀ
µz < 1
3. Average quality is increasing in s.
25